US violates UN law by threatening Iran
Iran’s envoy to the UN nuclear watchdog says the US nuclear policy which allows the use of nuclear arms against Tehran is a clear violation of the UN Charter.
Speaking on Monday, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh called on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to deal with the US violations.
The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) purportedly restricts the use of its nuclear arms against most non-atomic states, except Iran and North Korea, which are accused by the US of seeking nuclear weapons.
Soltanieh also said the outcome of the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is not binding as only a limited number of countries have been invited.
Unlike North Korea, Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tehran has stressed that its nuclear program is only for the civilian applications of the technology.
The UN nuclear watchdog has, in many reports, declared that there is no evidence of military objectives in Iran’s nuclear program.
“According to international laws, any threat to use nuclear weapons against other countries … is against the UN Charter, the [International Atomic Energy] Agency’s regulations and international laws,” ISNA quoted Soltanieh as saying.
“The UN Security Council should act swiftly and deal with the US violations in this regard.”
Later on Monday, US President Barack Obama was to open the nuclear security summit which is being attended by the leaders of 46 other countries. Iran is not represented at the conference.
“The outcome of the Washington conference is already known. Any decision taken at the meeting is not binding on those countries which are not represented at the conference,” Soltanieh said.
The Iranian envoy said the NPR proves Washington’s unreliability on the nuclear arms issue, adding that the new US policy shows that the nuclear-armed power is in fact a big threat to international peace. Source
US says Iran is not ‘nuclear capable’
April 10 2010
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has accused Iran of moving toward the production of nuclear weapons but said that Iran is not “nuclear capable” yet.
“I’d just say, and it’s our judgment here, they are not nuclear capable,” Gates said in an interview. “Not yet.”
Speaking to NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Gates said that Iran was “continuing to make progress” in its nuclear program, which Washington alleges also has a clandestine military component.
“It’s going slower… than they anticipated. But they are moving in that direction,” he claimed.
Gates denied that the US was resigned to Iran becoming a nuclear-armed power.
“We have not… drawn that conclusion at all. And in fact, we’re doing everything we can to try and keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons,” he said.
The Pentagon chief’s comments come despite the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has never found a shred of evidence indicating that Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program.
Iran, which is an IAEA member and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has repeatedly declared that the only aim of its nuclear program is producing energy for peaceful purposes. Source
Iran has been promised nuclear fuel for over 30 years now. Despite being a 10-percent shareholder and hence entitled to the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium (Eurodif)’s output, Iran has never received enriched uranium from France.
Tehran and Paris have also signed a deal, under which France is obliged to deliver 50 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Iran — another obligation France has failed to meet. Source
US Refuses To Allow Monitoring Of WMD, President Obama rejected inspection protocol for US biological weapons
‘Shocking the World believes same Iraq-style lies about Iran’
U.S. Intelligence Found Iran Nuke Document Was Forged
Pentagon’s Role in Global Catastrophe: Add Climate Havoc to War Crimes
Study finds: Iraq littered with high levels of nuclear and dioxin contamination
Japan Report: Private Agreements Allowed US to Bring Nukes
A little history on the instigator of this threat of war on Iran.
Arab League Calls for Inspection of Israel’s Nuclear Installations (IsraelWire- July 22 1998
According to a Jordan Times newspaper report, the Arab League on Tuesday adopted a resolution urging the international community to stop providing Israel with material for its nuclear program until it allows inspection of its installations.
Nuclear Overview
Introduction
Israel is the sixth nation in the world, and the first in the Middle East, to develop and acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Israel initiated its nuclear program in earnest in the mid-to-late 1950s, and by late 1966, it had completed the R&D phase of its first nuclear weapon device. Since 1970, Israel’s status as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) has become an accepted international fact.
However, Israel’s behavior as a NWS has been distinctly different from the behavior of the five official members of the nuclear club that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom; and India and Pakistan, which have not signed the NPT. While these nations have publicly declared their nuclear status, Israel, to this day, has never confirmed or denied its nuclear status and remains outside the NPT. Since Prime Minister Levi Eshkol pledged in the mid-1960s that “Israel will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East,” all his successors have adhered to this opaque declared policy, and this policy has become known as Israel’s policy of “nuclear opacity” or ambiguity.
Israel is now an advanced NWS, in both quality and quantity of its arsenal. Estimates as to the size of Israel’s nuclear arsenal vary and range from 100 to over 200 warheads.
History
The history of the Israeli nuclear project is still shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. As part of Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity (see below), Israel’s military censorship prohibits publication of any factual Israeli-based information on the nuclear project.[1] Consequently, only fragmentary bits and pieces of information on the topic have ever been published, and most commonly only in the form of unconfirmed press reports by the non-Israeli press. Thus, the historical narrative offered here is sketchy and incomplete. Its main source for the period up to 1970 is Avner Cohen’s book Israel and the Bomb, while for the more recent period, it is based on various non-Israeli reports and publications (all unconfirmed), including the so-called Vanunu testimony, the disclosure made on 5 October 1986 in the London Sunday Times, based on a testimony of Mordechai Vanunu, a technician who had worked at the Dimona nuclear facility and subsequently broke his oath of secrecy.[2]
The Initiation Phase
David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, was obsessed and driven by the vision that a nuclear capability would be the answer to Israel’s security predicament. He considered the Arab-Israeli conflict to be deep and enduring, and, consequently, he believed that the resolution of the conflict could come only after the Arabs were compelled to accept the existence of the state of Israel. Until that time, Israel would have to rely on its sword. Furthermore, only technology, he believed, could provide Israel the qualitative edge necessary to overcome its inferiority in population, resources, and size. As Shimon Peres (his aide at the time) once put it, “Ben-Gurion believed that science could compensate us for what Nature has denied us.”[3] This phrase is, in essence, the whole rationale for Israel’s nuclear project.
Two other men were instrumental in making Ben-Gurion’s nuclear vision a reality. The first was Professor Ernst David Bergmann, an organic chemist by training, who was Ben-Gurion’s close scientific advisor. In 1952, Bergmann founded the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) as the vehicle through which to realize this nuclear vision. The second was Shimon Peres, then young director-general of the Ministry of Defense, who was the administrator-politician who promoted that vision. As the architect of the “special relations” between Israel and France in the mid-to-late 1950s, Peres was the man behind the French-Israeli nuclear deal under which the nuclear complex in Dimona was built. For all practical purposes, Peres was the chief executive of the project during its initiation stage (a role he filled until he left the Ministry of Defense in 1965).
From early on, Peres recognized that it would be impossible for Israel to fulfill its nuclear dream on its own. He concluded that Israel needed a major foreign nuclear supplier. In 1955, Israel was the second nation in the world to sign an agreement under the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program, but it soon recognized that this program could not be the prime vehicle for Israel through which to build an ambitious nuclear program aimed at military applications. France, on the other hand—which at the time was considering its own military nuclear program—seemed the most logical choice as the project’s primary foreign supplier. The nuclear issue was clearly one of the underlying motives behind Peres’ efforts to build the France-Israel alliance in the mid-to-late 1950s.
Israeli-French nuclear discussions about a major nuclear deal had been initiated prior to the 1956 Suez campaign—a brief armed conflict in which Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, attacked Egypt in response to the Arab nation’s blockading of the Suez Canal and its support of border-area attacks by Arab fighters. But it was that joint military campaign – and in particular the Soviet Union’s veiled nuclear threats against both countries during the campaign – that gave impetus to the sensitive talks between Israel and France. Still, it took Peres another year of on-and-off negotiations to produce the entire package, during which time a heated- but quiet – debate took place in Israel itself about the technological, financial, and political feasibility and desirability of the project. Ultimately, however, it was Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s project, and he gave the necessary support to Peres to complete the deal.
In early 2007, a biography about Shimon Peres was published which revealed new information regarding the signing of the French-Israeli nuclear deal, indicating that the deal may have been signed a day earlier than previously thought. According to the author, Michael Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres persuaded French Prime Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury to backdate the deal by one day. This was done because of the fact that the government of Bourges-Maunoury had fallen the day before which would have annulled the deal had it become known at the time.[4] The French-Israeli nuclear deal was secretly signed in Paris on 3 October 1957. The details of the bilateral agreement are still unknown, but it is believed to have consisted of two sets of agreements. The first was a political agreement between the two governments; it was general and vague and dealt with the political and legal obligations of the two parties. The second was a technical agreement between the two nations’ nuclear commissions; it referred to the specifics of the scientific and technological cooperation between the two states. According to French author Pierre Pean, the most sensitive aspects of the package were not spelled out in any of the official documents but were left as verbal understandings. Pean suggests also that the governmental documents did not reflect the full scope of the Dimona deal. For example, the most sensitive and secret component of the entire package, the reprocessing plant, apparently has no explicit reference in the official documents.[5]
Sometime in early 1958, Israel started the excavation and construction work at the Dimona site. When French President de Gaulle learned soon after his election about the secret project, he acted to end French participation in it, but it took almost a year until his decision was translated into meaningful action. When de Gaulle informed Ben-Gurion in June 1960 about his decision, Israel decided to complete the project on its own.[6]
Not until December 1960, almost three years after the Dimona project had been initiated, did the United States learn about it. As the departing Eisenhower administration made its discovery public, it demanded an Israeli explanation as to the nature of the project. In response, the Israeli government told the U.S. government that the new project was for “peaceful purposes.” On 23 December 1960, Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) that the 24-megawatt (MW) research reactor under construction would be “peaceful,” designed for scientific, industrial, and medical applications. This was the first and last time that the Israeli government made a public statement about the Dimona project.[7]
In retrospect, this statement entailed the strategy that Israel would use to overcome U.S. opposition to the project in the early mid-1960s. From the outset, the Israeli nuclear case posed a great challenge to U.S. nonproliferation policy. President Kennedy was determined to thwart Israel’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, fearing that it could undermine his nonproliferation efforts. He firmly insisted that U.S. scientists be allowed to visit Dimona to verify Israel’s claims that the facility was not for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Such a visit took place in May 1961, setting the stage for a meeting between Ben-Gurion and President Kennedy. The meeting resulted in the nuclear issue being removed from the Israeli-U.S. agenda for two years.
Two years later, as construction at Dimona neared completion, Kennedy reapplied the pressure on Israel over Dimona. In a tough exchange of letters with Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol (who replaced Ben-Gurion in July 1963), Kennedy demanded semi-annual U.S. inspection visits in Dimona, threatening that bilateral relations would be “seriously jeopardized” if Israel did not comply with his demands. By late August 1963, after weeks of intense consultations, Israel appeared to agree with Kennedy’s demands – or at least so Kennedy was led to believe.
By the time U.S. scientists began the visits to Dimona in early 1964 according to the Kennedy-Eshkol deal, Kennedy had been assassinated, and President Johnson was less committed to nonproliferation in general and to the Israel case in particular. While Kennedy’s effort to halt the Israeli nuclear project failed, it shaped the very special mode under which Israel became a NWS. The United States was not in a position to stop the Israeli nuclear program – Israel, by that time, was already fully committed to creating a nuclear option – but U.S. policies determined the way in which Israel acquired the bomb. Israel developed the bomb opaquely, in a manner that avoided defying U.S. nonproliferation policies. A policy of ambiguity was born.
It was during the years of the Johnson administration that Israel crossed the technological nuclear threshold. While Israel completed the R&D work on its first nuclear device sometime in late 1966, it continued to pledge to the Johnson administration that “it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region.” Clearly, Israel was committed to having a nuclear option, but this did not mean necessarily a commitment to becoming a NWS. In fact, Israeli hesitation as to the future of its nuclear program seemed to intensify in the wake of a major accident at the Dimona facility in December 1966, which caused the shutdown of the nuclear plant for three months.
Crossing the Nuclear Threshold
The 1967 Six-Day War was a turning point in Israel’s nuclear history. In Israel and the Bomb, author Avner Cohen revealed that on the eve of the Six-Day War, in late May 1967, Israeli engineers improvised rudimentary, but operational, nuclear weapons—the first time that Israel assembled nuclear devices.[8] The 1967 war brought about a new political and strategic reality, as well as domestic changes in Israel itself that significantly decreased Israel’s nuclear inhibition. The fear that Israeli nuclear development could bring about a Middle East war was moot now. With its victory in the 1967 war, Israel had passed the vulnerable transition period with little opportunity for an Arab reaction.
However, by 1968 a new factor came into the picture and started to play a significant role in Israel’s nuclear behavior. The advent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), co-sponsored and signed by the United States in the summer of 1968, reshaped the U.S.-Israeli dialogue on the nuclear issue. By November 1968, against the background of strong U.S. pressure to join the NPT – a demand that was linked to the first sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel – Israel told the United States that, given its unique security needs, it could not sign the NPT at the present time. President Johnson ultimately approved the Phantom deal without linking it to Israeli concession on the NPT issue.
Less than one year later, in September 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir reached a secret agreement with President Richard Nixon on the Israeli nuclear issue. Meir explained to Nixon why Israel had been compelled to develop a nuclear capability, why it could not sign the NPT, but also stated that Israel would not become a declared nuclear power. That meant, operationally, that Israel would not test nuclear devices, would not declare itself a NWS, and would not use its nuclear status capability for diplomatic gains, but keep its bomb “in the basement.” While Israel would not join the NPT, it would not defy it either.
In the wake of the Meir-Nixon agreement, the United States ended its annual visits in Dimona; in addition, the United States no longer pressured Israel to sign the NPT, adopting instead a de-facto policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” This policy was perceived by both Israeli and U.S. policymakers as the only possible policy, both for Israel and the United States, capable of addressing both the uniqueness of Israel’s nuclear case in tandem with the United State’s own commitment to the nonproliferation regime. To this day, all Israeli and U.S. governments have adhered to this policy, and likewise, all subsequent U.S. administrations have looked the other way on the Israeli nuclear case.
In July 1970, the New York Times disclosed that Israel was considered by the U.S. intelligence community to be a NWS.[9] Shortly after, Israel started to deploy its first nuclear-capable missiles, the Jericho-I, a delivery system that had been initially built by a French contractor but, due to the French embargo, was transferred to Israel and completed in one of the plants of the Israeli Aviation Industries. By the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel was already a small nuclear power.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War had a nuclear dimension even though the full drama has never been told (or even officially confirmed). It has been reported that during the early phase of the war, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan readied the nuclear weapons infrastructure, apparently even proposing to Prime Minister Golda Meir to arm the weapons in case Israel suddenly reached the point of “last resort.” It is believed that Prime Minister Meir refused to concede to Dayan’s “last resort” thinking, and did not authorize the arming of the weapons. U.S. intelligence picked up signs that Israel put its nuclear-capable Jericho missiles on high alert—apparently in a way that was designed to be noticed. In her decision not to follow Dayan’s advise, Meir raised the bar on the issue of “last resort”: situations of “last resort” that could invoke use of nuclear weapons would be the most extreme situations a nation like Israel could ever face, and should be limited only to situations in which Israel’s survival was at stake. Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity had survived.
Nuclear Opacity: From Improvisation to Semi-Permanent National Posture
Israel’s nuclear history in the period from 1973 until the first Gulf War in 1990-91 can be recounted along two distinct themes. First, it was the period in which Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity was transformed from a short-lived improvisation to a semi-permanent strategic posture. In retrospect, the period from 1974 to 1990 was the golden age of nuclear opacity. By the end of the period, Israelis came to view the policy as a great strategic success because it provided Israel the benefits of existential deterrence at a very low political cost. Nuclear opacity became an indispensable pillar in its national security doctrine. In particular, the policy of nuclear opacity seemed to have removed the nuclear issue from the U.S.-Israeli agenda, without restricting Israel’s freedom of action in this field. For Israeli strategists, opacity was the best of all possible worlds. Even Vanunu’s public disclosure of Dimona’s secrets in 1986 (see footnote 2 and below) was not politically sufficient to shake Israel’s posture of opacity.
Second, it was a period of rapid growth for Israel’s nuclear arsenal, with Israel taking advantage of its freedom of action under opacity. It is widely believed (and supported by Vanunu’s information) that during this period, Israel’s nuclear arsenal made a major transformation. Israel no longer possessed a dozen or so low-yield first-generation bombs; it expanded and modernized its arsenal, which became qualitatively advanced and quantitatively sizable.
It is important to look at the lessons of the 1973 war in order to understand these changes. In the eyes of most Israeli strategists and military historians, Israel almost reached the brink, the moment of “last resort.” Had the Syrians been able to cross the Jordan River, this could have called for “last resort” nuclear use. Yet, it appears that Israel’s dozen or so bombs did not fit such a use. To stop armor columns moving on the Golan Heights, in the proximity of Israeli troops, Israel needed low-yield weapons for tactical use. But, presumably, Israel lacked such weapons. Also, if some Israeli leaders (such as Dayan) had concerns about the Soviet Union, Israel had no weapons to constitute even a minimum deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
According to Vanunu, since the mid-1970s, Israel had expanded and modernized its nuclear infrastructure in Dimona to be able to produce new types of advanced nuclear weaponry, small and large, and in greater quantities. Some sources believe that during that period Israel produced both larger advanced weapons (boosted, and possibly even thermonuclear) as well as advanced tactical weapons (possibly enhanced radiation weapons). In addition, by the mid-to-late 1970s, Israel started the development of the Jericho-II missile, a ballistic missile with an operational range of 1,500 kilometers or more. The Jericho-II was tested in the late 1980s, and it was deployed in 1989-90.
Israel significantly expanded its nuclear capability throughout that period, but it did not move to establish a secured second-strike capability. While apparently there were occasional discussions about this, operational and costly decisions were deferred. The underlying assumption that guided Israel’s strategic planning was that Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly was still holding, and if and when this situation changed, Israel would have ample time to adjust. This assessment was reinforced by the success of Israel’s attack on the Iraqi Osiraq reactor in 1981. Until the late 1980s, Israel assumed that Saddam’s nuclear vision was for all practical purposes dead. But this assumption came under scrutiny by the late 1980s. As the Iran-Iraq War came to a close, Iraq emerged as a regional Arab power with strong nuclear aspirations. In 1990, before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Israeli strategists believed that Israel and Iraq were on a path to conflict within a few years.
During the buildup of the first Gulf War, and as a reaction to Iraqi missile threats, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir issued an unveiled threat to Iraq without directly referring to the Israeli nuclear arsenal: “all those who threaten us should know that whoever dares strike Israel will be struck hard and in the most severe way,” adding that ”…Israel has a very strong deterrent capability.”[10] Defense Minister Moshe Ayan went even further by warning Saddam Hussein about Israeli weapons, “which the world does not yet know about.”[11] During an Arrow anti-missile test in August 1990, intended to underscore Israeli missile capabilities, military officials spoke of “other responses” to potential Iraqi chemical attacks on Israeli territory.[12]
The post-Gulf War nuclear developments, both in Iraq and Iran, compounded by the international community’s intelligence failure in detecting Iraq’s nuclear program, were critical in Israel’s strategic decision to establish its own sea-based strategic force. The Israeli Navy had been pushing for a small fleet of modern diesel submarines for “strategic purposes” since the early 1980s, and after long negotiations with Germany, the Thyssen-Nordseewerke shipyard in Emden, and the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG shipyard in Kiel were chosen as the contractors to build three modern diesel-electric 1900-ton Dolphin-class submarines, equipped with ten 21-inch multipurpose tubes capable of launching torpedoes, mines, and cruise missiles.[13][14] In June 2000, the Sunday Times broke a story about an alleged Israeli test-launch of a nuclear capable submarine-launched-cruise-missile (SLCM) in the Indian ocean, using the newly commissioned Dolphin submarines. According to unconfirmed reports the missile hit its target at a range of around 1500km.[15] It is believed that the alleged test missile was based on the Israeli Popeye, an ALCM with a range of 250-300kms.[16] Israel has categorically denied the allegations about the missile tests in the Indian Ocean.[17] In 2003, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Israeli and American officials announced that Israel had deployed U.S. supplied Harpoon ASCMs on its Dolphin submarines and modified the missiles to carry nuclear warheads.[19] Prominent missile experts believe this to be a real possibility, though the range of the Harpoon armed with an Israeli nuclear warhead would probably be decreased to around 90kms due to the added weight. In November 2005, Israel signed a contract worth $1.17 billion with Germany for the construction of two more attack submarines, the first of which is planned to be completed by 2012.[20] These factors underline that having secured a sea launch capability, Israel has, or is well on its way to having its own nuclear triad with sea, land, and air launched options.
On 21 April 2004, after 18 years in an Israeli prison, nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu was released. However, in July 2007, Vanunu was sentenced to an additional six months in prison after violating a gag order that had been placed on him that forbade him from further disclosing details about the nuclear program.[21] The Israeli government also set severe restrictions on his movements and conduct after his initial release from prison in 2004. In July of the same year, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission launched an official website providing only general details about Israel’s civilian nuclear program. Later that month International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohammed El-Baradei visited Israel to meet with government officials. Despite El-Baradei’s visit, Israel continues to assert that it will not discuss disarmament issues until after a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace agreement has been reached.
In an interesting development in early 2007, following the progress of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, Israeli officials lobbied their American counterparts to convince the NSG to allow Israel to conduct nuclear trade without being subjected to full-scope safeguards. Even though the U.S. declined this request,[22] Israel nonetheless presented a plan to the NSG suggesting an objective set of criteria to judge whether to allow nuclear trade with non-NPT states. The proposal was greeted unenthusiastically; and the Bush administration only reiterated its stance that the India deal could not be seen as a precedent for other non-NPT states.[23] These efforts by Israel to lobby the NSG have come at a time when the Israeli government has expressed an active interest in nuclear energy generation.[24] This has been confirmed by the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in an official statement, citing an increasing shortage in indigenous electricity production capacity and the government’s wish to reduce dependency on imported energy sources.[25]
In August 2007, National Infrastructure Minister, Ben-Eliezer told a gathering of engineers of the Israel Electric Corporation (ICE), that he would soon submit a proposal to the government that suggests building a nuclear power plant at Shivta, on the border with Egypt in the South of Israel. According to Ben-Eliezer, the plan calls for the construction of a 1,200 to 1,500MW plant over nine years.[26] So far there have been no discussions with any foreign vendors about reactor exports, but it is understood that Israel will be looking to U.S. supplied reactor technology. Furthermore, it is believed that the plan would entail similar provisions as those in the U.S.-India nuclear deal, i.e., that the supplied reactor would be put under safeguards, with other Israeli nuclear facilities being exempt.[27] Presently, all cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field is limited to safety and it remains to be seen what steps Israel takes in moving forward on its plans for civilian nuclear power generation.
Key Sources and Notes:
[1]When Israeli researcher and author Avner Cohen published, without censorship approval, his book Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)—a political history of the Israeli nuclear project until 1970 based on some exclusive Israeli sources—the Israeli authorities interrogated him at length and considered filing charges against him. This case highlighted the extreme sensitivity of the subject and the effort of the Israeli authorities to ban Israeli-based historical research on the subject.
[2] This was the first, and only, time in which an insider from the Israeli nuclear program divulged information on the program. Those revelations implied that Israel’s nuclear program is more sophisticated and advanced than it had been commonly estimated until then. Some analysts interpreted the information Vanunu provided and concluded that Israel’s nuclear arsenal may be at the level of 100 to 200 weapons, possibly even some thermonuclear weapons.
[3] Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), p. 132.
[4] Pierre Pean, Les Deux Bombes (Paris: Fayard, 1981), pp. 95-96, 110.
[5] “Author says Shimon Peres persuaded France to backdate nuclear deal with Israel in 1957,” International Herald Tribune, 20 March 2007.
[6] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 73-75.
[7] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 79-97.
[8] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 273-276.
[9] Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or its Parts,” New York Times, 18 July 1970.
[10] Bob Hepburn, “Israel on full alert after Iraqi threat,” The Toronto Star, 26 December, 1990.
[11] Andrew Meisels, “Israel vows it can defeat Iraq even without U.S. help,” The Washington Times, 24 September, 1990.
[12] Andrew Meisels, “Israeli missile test sends a message to Baghdad,” The Washington Times, 10 August, 1990.
[13] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, “Deadly Arsenals,” 2nd edition, Carnegie Endownment for Peace: Washington D.C., 2005.
[14] Ed Blanche, “Israel denies sub-launched missile tests, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 August 2000.
[15] Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell, “Israel makes nuclear waves with submarine missile test,” Sunday Times, 18 June 2000.
[16] “Popey Turbo,” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ israel/ missile/ popeye-t.htm.
[17] Ed Blanche, “Israel denies sub-launched missile tests, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 August 2000.
[18] Peter Beaumont, Conel Urquhart, “Israel fits nuclear arms in submarines,” The Observer, 12 October 2003.
[19] Schechter, “Harpoon missile story politically motivated,” The Jerusalem Post, 13 October, 2003.
[20] Alon Ben-David, “Israel looks to acquire more German submarines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 November 2005.
[21] Nir Hason, “Court Returns Israeli ‘Nuclear Whistleblower’ Vanunu to Jail for Violating Parole.” in OSC Document GMP20070702735002, 2 July 2007.
[22] Mark Hibbs, “US rebuffed Israeli request for exemption from NSG trade rule,” Nuclear Fuel, 1 January 2007.
[23] Glenn Kessler, “Israel submits nuclear trade plan, move may complicate efforts to win exemption for India,” The Washington Post, 30 September 2007.
[24] Neal Sandler, “Israel’s infrastructure minister hints at support of nuclear power,” Nucleonics Week, 25 January 2007.
[25] Neal Sandler, “Israel considering building nuclear plant, AEC confirms,” Nucleonics Week, 15 Fenruary 2007.
[26] Neal Sandler, Mark Hibbs, and Daniel Horner, “Israel counting on US-India deal to further power reactor project,” Nucleonics Week, 16 August 2007.
[27] Neal Sandler, Mark Hibbs, and Daniel Horner, “Israel counting on US-India deal to further power reactor project,” Nucleonics Week, 16 August 2007.
Israel Chemical Chronology
1948-2003
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
April 1948
David Ben-Gurion writes a letter to Ehud Avriel, a Jewish Agency operative in Europe, telling him to seek out and recruit East European Jewish scientists who can “either increase the capacity to kill masses or to cure masses.”
–Avner Cohen, “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 27.
1952
The Science Corps (HEMED) becomes part of a group of Ministry of Defense (MOD) sponsored civilian research centers that are known as “Machons.” Through this, Professor Ernst David Bergmann, a member of a group of scientists who pressured Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to establish a chemical and biological weapons program, establishes both the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the Israeli Institute of Biological Research (IIBR).
–Avner Cohen, “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 33.
1955
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion launches a project to develop a “cheap non-conventional capability.” Ben-Gurion orders that this capability be operational as soon as possible and before a war with Egypt.
–Aluf Benn, “The project that Preceded the Nuclear Option,” Ha’aretz, 2 March 1995.
Mid 1950’s
Israel initiates it chemical weapons program.
–Avner Cohen, “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 38.
1960
Israel collaborates with France on upgrading its chemical weapons. Israeli scientists make visits to the French chemical weapons testing site located at Beni Ounif, which is located in the Algerian Sahara.
–Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option, (NY: Random House, 1991), p. 64.
Mid 1960’s
Israel upgrades its offensive chemical weapons capability in suspecting Egyptian chemical weapons advancements.
–Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option, (Random House, 1991), p. 63.
20 February 1969
Israel accedes to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons in war.
1970’s
Production of indigenous mustard and nerve agents begins.
–“China and Israel,” Economist Foreign Report, 12 July 1984.
1974
U.S. Lieutenant General E.H. Almquist tells the Senate Armed Forces Committee that Israel’s chemical weapons program is operational.
–E.J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997, available online at <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/so97hogendoom.html>, accessed on 10/11/03.
1 July 1982
A commentary by the Soviet newswire TASS, states that reports from Beirut have stated that Israel is using chemical weapons including BZ nerve gas [sic.] in its invasion of Lebanon.
–“Alleged use of Nerve Gas in Lebanon,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 July 1982.
5 July 1982
The Soviet Union accuses the United States of providing Israel with ‘barbarous’ weapons. It states that these weapons, which include napalm, chemical weapons, and cluster and pellet bombs, are used in the Israel invasion of Lebanon.
–“Moscow Scores U.S. Role in Mideast,” United Press International, 5 July 1982.
30 August 1983
A commentary written by Viktor Vinogradov for the Soviet Defense Ministry daily ‘Krasnaya Zvezda’ states that Israel and South Africa are working together on chemical weapons at a research institute operated by the South African Air Force.
–“RSA-Israeli Research on Racially Selective Mass Destruction Weapons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 September 1983.
15 September 1988
The Korean Committee for Asian-African Cooperation in Pyongyang denounces Israel for allegedly using chemical weapons and “germ warfare” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, killing many residents in the area.
–“Pyongyang Denounces Israel for Massacre of Palestinians,” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 15 September 1988.
4 December 1988
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) accuses the Israeli Army of using a new chemical weapon against Palestinians living in the occupied territories. According to a statement released by the group, the new chemical weapon is causing various wounds and “organic complications.” The PFLP cites evidence presented by Arab doctors who have treated victims in the villages of Tobay and Tamoun, as proof the Israel is using such weapons and calls on UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and international organizations that defend human rights, to investigate.
–“Israeli use of Chemical Weapons against Palestinians Denounced,” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 4 December 1988.
22 December 1988
The Arab League issues a statement that Israel was the first country to introduce chemical weapons to the Middle East.
–“Libya Denies U.S. Accusation of Chemical Arms Production,” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 22 December 1988.
January-February 1989
Under increasing public pressure to respond to regional chemical weapons proliferation, Israeli officials including Binyamin Netanyahu partially admit possession of a chemical weapons program.
–Mortimer, E., “Israel Hints It Keeps Chemical Weapons as Defensive Measure,” Financial Times, 10 January 1989; Arms Control Reporter, February 1989, p. 704.
6 February 1989
The League of Arab States’ Committee of Seven releases a statement that criticizes Israel’s repressive actions against the Palestinian uprising. It condemns among other things, Israel’s use of chemical weapons against the local Palestinian population.
–“Arab League’s Committee of Seven-Statement,” TASS, 7 February 1989.
1990
A report by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) entitled “Offensive Chemical Warfare Programs in the Middle East,” states that Israel maintains a chemical testing facility possibly in the Negev desert.
–“Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Middle East,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 April 2002; Hogendoorn, E.J., “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997, <:http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/so97hogendoom.html>, accessed on 10/11/03.
July 1990
Israeli Minister of Science, Yuval Ne’eman states that if Iraq uses chemical weapons Israel will retaliate “with the same merchandise.” Ne’eman also proposes to the Israeli Cabinet that Israel should issue a credible chemical weapon threat in the face of the threat from Iraq’s chemical weapons.
–“Israelis See Chemical Option Against Iraq,” New York Times, 28 July 1990.
4 October 1992
A Boeing 747 cargo plane operated by the Israeli airline El Al crashes into the Bijlmer neighborhood in Amsterdam, Holland. It is later learned that the plane was carrying a shipment of dimethylmethylphosphonate (DMMP),a chemical used to make sarin, to Israel.
–Christopher Walker “Dutch Link Poor Health to Jet Crash,” The Times, 23 April 1999; Janet McBride “El Al Crash Report Said to be Critical of Dutch PM,” The Jerusalem Post, 22 April 1999, News p. 3.
November 1992
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres states that Israel will sign the Chemical Weapons Convention.
–“Lebanon Refuses to Sign Chemical Weapons Treaty in Paris,” Agence France Presse, 15 December 1992.
13 January 1993
Israel signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.
20 February 1993
The Libyan Foreign Ministry releases a statement in which it criticizes the West because “Israel’s development of chemical and biological weapons is overlooked.”
–“Libya Accuses West of ‘Psychological Terrorism,'” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 20 February 1993.
8 March 1993
The Arab League again rejects the Chemical Weapons Convention because it states that it cannot accept such a treaty as long as Israel still possesses chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
–“Arab League Reiterates Rejection of Chemical Arms Ban Treaty,” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 8 March 1993.
8 November 1993
An article in the U.S. magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology, states that Russia believes that Israel possesses chemical weapons. According to the article, a Russian intelligence report states that it believes that Israel possesses indigenous chemical weapons.
–“Israeli Missile Base Hidden near Jerusalem, report,” Agence France Presse, 8 November 1993.
28 January 1994
According to the book Critical Mass, authored by Williams Burrows and Robert Windrem, Israel maintains a chemical weapons factory five floors below ground at Dimona.
–George, Alan “Israel has Arsenal of 200 N-bombs,” Evening Standard, 28 January 1994, p. 7.
17 April 1996
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in a speech states that Libya has the right to possess chemical weapons because Israel possesses nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He also states that the U.S. should attack Israel because it possesses these weapons.
–“Libya is Entitled to Have Chemical Weapons, Gaddafi,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 17 April 1996; “Libya Again Denies US Allegation on Nuclear Weapon Plant,” Xinhua News Agency, 17 April 1996.
6 June 1996
Egypt’s state run press issues an article in which it states that “if the United States is really concerned about the issue of armament in the region, then it will have to start first with the nuclear and chemical weapons of Israel.”
–“Egypt’s State-run Press Accuses US of Interfering in Internal Affairs,” Xinhua News Agency, 29 June 1996.
9 August 1996
The Libyan news agency JANA reports that Libya has called for an urgent meeting of the Arab League in the midst of allegations that Israel was developing chemical and biological weapons. According to the report, Libya has conducted extensive consultations with Arab League members “following information that the Israeli enemy possesses chemical and bacteriological weapons, including toxic gases, developed in a factory in the Negev desert.” Libya reportedly has called the meeting because of the danger these developments pose.
–“Libya Calls Arab League Talks over Israel’s Weapons Arsenal,” Agence France Presse, 9 August 1996.
13 August 1996
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi sends a telegraph to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat calling for Arabs to take measures to confront Israel’s possession of chemical and biological weapons. The telegraph states that international institutions must disarm Israel of such weapons.
–“Gaddafi Calls for Measure to Face up to Israel’s Chemical Weapons,” Xinhua News Agency, 13 August 1996.
30 October 1996
The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), a rebel group located on the Papua New Guinea Island of Bougainville, accuses Israel of providing the Papua New Guinea Defense Forces (PNGDF) with “chemical bombs.” According to a statement released by the group, the PNGDF is dropping the bombs by helicopters and the bombs are causing skin irritation and burning. The Israeli Embassy in Wellington denies the allegations.
–“Israel Denies Supplying ‘Chemical Bombs’ for use on Bougainville,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 November 1996.
14 November 1996
Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Dr. Hassan Rohani, states during his visit to Ireland that Israel and not Iran possesses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
–MacConnell, Sean “Iranian Outlines Difficulties with Beef Trade,” The Irish Times, 15 November 1996, p. 8.
1997
Israel’s position on the Chemical Weapons Convention is reviewed by a committee headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The committee decides not to submit the convention for ratification to the Israeli parliament.
–Avner Cohen “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8., No. 3, pp. 46-47.
1 August 1997
Israeli officials approve a plan to assassinate Hamas operative Khamel Meshaal using a chemical weapon.
–Blanche, Ed, “Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 18.
3 September 1997
Israel Army Radio reports that Israel is to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
–“News at a Glance 1600 GMT,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 3 September 1997.
Early September 1997
Agents from Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, practice using a fake chemical weapon against unknowing civilians. The exercise is used as a trial run for an operation in which Mossad agents plan to assassinate a Hamas operative named Khaled Meshaal.
–Blanche, Ed, “Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No.1, 1 January 1998, p. 18.
4 September 1997
Israel Foreign Ministry Director-General Eytan Bentsur tells the Conference on Disarmament that Israel will not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Bentsur states that Israel cannot ratify the convention because no Arab state has signed it.
–“Israel Won’t Ratify Chemical Weapons Pact,” Jerusalem Post, 5 September 1997, p. 24.
25 September 1997
Two Israeli Mossad agents attempt to poison Hamas operative Khaled Meshaal with a “high tech” chemical weapon in Amman, Jordan. Meshaal is targeted because of his alleged involvement in two suicide attacks in Jerusalem on 30 July 1998 and 4 September 1998. It is believed that the chemical used in the attack is synthetic opiate called Fentanyl. The chemical can be absorbed through the skin and can kill a person in 48 hours. The chemical was reportedly manufactured at the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR). Israeli officials also claim that Meshaal arranged for the shipping of the explosives used to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. They claim he also hired the operatives to carry out the operation. Two Mossad agents are captured in the operation by Jordanian officials.
–King, Peter “A Year After Mossad Attack, Jordan Wants to Forget, HAMAS to Fight on,” Agence France Presse, 24 September 1998; Blanche, Ed, “Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 18; Mahnaimi, Uzi, “Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare,” Sunday Times, 4 October 1998.
27 September 1997
Hamas operative Khaled Meshaal is administered an antidote given to Jordanian officials by Israel. Israel gives the antidote as part of an agreement in which two Mossad agents who attempted to assassinate Meshaal, are released into Israeli custody.
–Blanche, Ed, “Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 18.
6 October 1997
Two Israeli Mossad agents are released after being captured for the attempted assassination of Hamas operative Khaled Meshaal.
–Blanche, Ed, “Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 18.
1998
The IIBR drops plans to expand its facilities in Ness Ziona due to local pressure exerted by the major and concerned citizens over the environmental and safety hazards associated with the suspected biological activities of the complex.
–Lavie, Mark, “Rumors Abound About Israeli Center,” Associated Press, 24 October 1998; Walker, Christopher “Israeli Court Blow to Germ War Plant,” The Times, 25 September 1998.
17 May 1998
Jose Mauricio Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) states that Israel is likely to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) sooner rather than later.
–“OPCW Inspects Sites in 30 Nations Under Chemical Weapons Treaty,” JiJi Press Ticker Service, 18 March 1998.
May 1998
A statement released by the official JANA news agency in Libya states that Libya is “‘surprised by the United States’ rush to impose sanctions on Pakistan when (Washington) won’t even lift the smallest finger against the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons which Israel has.”
–Rechnagel, Charles “Middle East Ponders Consequences of first ‘Islamic Bomb,'” Agence France Presse, 29 May 1998.
10-15 May 1998
The Israeli company Kinetics Ltd. participates in the 6th international conference for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The conference talks about ways of detecting chemical agents and ways of protecting medical personnel in the events that such an agent is used. Companies involved in the conference display their new equipment that addresses these issues.
–“NBC Proliferation-6th International Symposium,” Intelligence Newsletter, 5 March 1998, No. 330.
14 May 1998
A report by the Libyan news agency JANA criticizes U.S. sanctions against Pakistan for its nuclear program because the U.S. does not sanction Israel which according to the report maintains “vast quantities of biological and chemical weapons.”
–“India: Libyan Agency Criticizes U.S. Sanctions,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 May 1998.
7 July 1998
In a visit to Pakistan, the speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Ali-Akbar Nateq-Nuri states that “Israel serves as a nuclear and chemical weapons depot and poses a big threat to Muslims.”
–“Iranian Speaker Warns Visiting Pakistani’s of Plot to fan Muslim Rivalries,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 July 1998.
August 1998
The Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, publishes a long expose in which is calls the Israeli Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) “metropolitan Tel Aviv’s most severe environmental hazard” and also raises questions regarding the secrecy surrounding institute’s activities.
–Avner Cohen “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 36.
19 August 1998
The British magazine Foreign Report reports four workers have been killed and 25 injured at the IIBR in recent years due to separate accidents. It also reports the authorities also ordered the evacuation of the surrounding area following one of the accidents.
–Davis, Douglas “Report: 4 Killed, 25 Hurt, at Secret Institute,” Jerusalem Post, 20 August 1998, p. 2.
23 September 1998
Israeli citizens living near the Israel Institute of Biological Research file an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court to prevent the expansion of the institute.
–“Israelis File to Suit to Block Chemical Weapons Plant Expansion,” Agence France Presse, 23 September 1998.
24 September 1998
The Israeli Supreme Court accepts a complaint filed by the mayor of Ness Ziona, Yossi Shvo, calling for a halt in the expansion of the Israel Institute of Biological Research based on environmental concerns.
–“Crashed jet Held Nerve-gas Chemical Dutch in Uproar Over Israeli Cargo.” The Toronto Star, 2 October 1998, P A12; Walker, Christopher “Israeli Court Blow to Germ War Plant,” The Times, 25 September 1998.
27 September 1998
In an interview with reporters at the United Nations, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami states that Iran has in that past expressed concern that “Israel has become an arsenal of nuclear atomic weapons, chemical weapons, and weapons of mass destruction.”
–“Iran: Khatami Addresses News Conference During Visit to the UN,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 September 1998.
1 October 1998
Israel confirms that an El Al Boeing 747 cargo aircraft which crashed near Amsterdam in 1992 was carrying a shipment of 190 liters of DMMP, a chemical that can be used in the production sarin. Israeli authorities however, contend that the shipment was for legitimate purposes and that the chemicals were approved by the U.S. Department of Commerce and were to be used to test filters. They also order an investigation into allegations that the DMMP was for its chemical weapons program. The shipment was destined for the IIBR.
–“Crashed jet Held Nerve-gas Chemical Dutch in Uproar Over Israeli Cargo.” The Toronto Star, 2 October 1998, P A12; “El Al Confirms Crashed Plane Carried Substance for Nerve Gas,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1 October 1998.
4 October 1998
A report published in the Sunday Times of London states that Israeli F-16’s have the capability to perform missions with chemical and biological weapons that were produced at the IIBR. According to the report, crews have been trained to load such munitions onto the planes within a matter of minutes. The article cites “military sources” as the sources for the report.
–Cordesman, Anthony H., “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003; Mahnaimi, Uzi, “Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare,” Sunday Times, 4 October 1998.
6 October 1998
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak states that the Israelis are “in the process of arming themselves with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”
–“Egypt Concerned by Israeli Arsenal, Wants Balance of Forces,” Agence France Presse, 6 October 1998.
13 March 1999
At a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, Palestine National Council member Abdullah Abdullah accused Israel of manufacturing chemical weapons at the IIBR.
–“PNC Member Accuses Israel of Making Non-conventional Arms,” Jerusalem Post, 14 March 1999, p. 3.
2 April 1999
The United Kingdom partially lifts a ban that did not allow Israeli nuclear scientists and those associated with the development of chemical and biological weapons to enter the U.K. for professional conferences or to visit research institutes.
–“Britain Suspends ban on Israeli Nuclear Scientists,” Xinhua News Agency, 2 April 1999.
6 April 1999
Ali Kazak, the head of The General Palestinian Delegation to Australia, New Zealand, and the South Pacific, writes an Op-ed article in the Sydney Morning Herald. In the article he asserts that Israel “possesses nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them not only to every city and village in the entire Arab world but as far as Central Asia and to every city in Europe.”
–“There is Only One Peaceful Option,” Sydney Morning Herald, 6 April 1999.
27 April 1999
The Dutch government confirms that it sent 20 milligrams of soman nerve agent to the IIBR in 1996. According to shipping documents, the gas was intended for medical research within Israel.
–“Holland Confirms it Gave Israel Nerve Gas Samples,” Jerusalem Post, 28 April 1999. News p. 9.
2 February 2000
During a Knesset debate about Israel’s nuclear weapons program, Arab legislator Issam Makhul states that Israel’s “stockpile of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons jeopardize the country’s security.”
–“”Debate about Israel’s Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 February 2000, available online at http://www.thebulletin.org, accessed on 10/11/03.
September 2000
Israeli call for a review of the 1997 government decision not to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
–Avner Cohen “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 47.
15 February 2001
Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat accuses Israel of using poison gas against Palestinians. His accusation is based on reports that approximately 80 Palestinians, suffering from poison gas effects, were recently admitted to a Gaza hospital. The Israelis deny using poison gas; however, the Palestinians intend to send a sample of the gas to an international lab for independent analysis.
–“Arafat accuses Israel of using poison gas,” CNN, 15 February 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/02/15/arafat.gas/>.
28 November 2001
According to the Egyptian state-run MENA news agency, President Hosni Mubarak in answering allegations that Egypt signed an arms deal with North Korea, states that Israel is the only Middle Eastern country to possess both nuclear and chemical weapons.
–“Mubarak Rejects Israel Reports on Egypt’s Arms Deal with North Korea,” Xinhua, 28 November 2001.
16 May 2001
In a speech at the sixth conference for the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Hague, the head of the Saudi delegation, Dr. Sulman Bin Hammad Al-Khuweiter calls on Israel and other countries who posses chemical weapons to place these weapons under the auspice of the international treaty. Saudi Arabia also wants other countries to exert their influence to insure that these countries comply.
–“Kingdom Concerned at Stockpiling of Chemical Arms by Some Nations; Israel, Other Urged to Allow Scrutiny of Banned Weapons,” Middle East Newsfile, 16 May 2001.
9 June 2002
A report in the English newspaper The Herald accuses the British government of selling chemical weapon technology to Israel.
–“Meanwhile the UK Quietly Continues to Profit from War,” The Sunday Herald, 9 June 2002, p. 10.
10 September 2002
An Israeli man who gave his name only as Avi states that he got cancer from working at a secret chemical warfare laboratory. According to the man, he worked at the lab as a technician during the 1980’s and worked on such things are developing methods for decontamination, detecting poison gas, and testing the effectiveness of protective equipment. Avi also states that when working at the lab, workers were not given protective clothing and this exposed them to many harmful chemicals. The Israeli military censor does not permit the publishing of the chemicals used at the laboratory.
–Katzenall, Jack “Israeli Blames his Service in Army Chemical Warfare Research Unit for his Cancer,” Associated Press, 10 September 2002, International News.
7 to 11 October 2002
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) holds the Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties. Israel attends and participates as an observer.
—Report of the Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 7 – 11 October 2003, C-7/5, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 11 October 2002, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/c_7_5.pdf>.
25 October 2002
Arab Justice Ministers release the Beirut Declaration in which they denounce the threat of using force against an Arab country, especially when Israel possesses nuclear and chemical weapons.
–“Arab Justice Ministers Condemn ‘All’ Terrorism, Use of Force Against Countries,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 25 October 2002.
6 December 2002
German Defense Minister Peter Struck decides not to deliver six Fuch vehicles to Israel for fear that the vehicles could be used for offensive purposes. The Fuch is a vehicle designed to survey areas hit by a nuclear, chemical, or biological explosion and determines whether or not it is safe for humans.
–“Israeli President: We Won’t Accept Condition on Fuch Vehicles,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 December 2002.
December 2002
The Israel Defense Forces conduct live-condition exercises that test protection equipment in the event of a chemical weapons attack.
–“Israeli Army Successfully Tests Chemical Warfare Equipment-TV,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 22 December 2002.
16 March 2003
A documentary produced by the BBC accuses Israel of hiding nuclear bomb factories and developing chemical weapons.
–“Israel Protest,” Daily Mail, 15 March 2003.
14 April 2003
The Press Secretary for the Syrian Foreign Ministry states that Syria does not possess chemical weapons and that Israel is the only country in the region which does.
–“Syrian Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Denies Having Chemical Weapons,” Asahi Shimbun, 15 April 2003, available online at http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0415/004.html, accessed on 4/15/03.
17 May 2003
Iran accuses Israel of possessing the largest arsenal of chemical weapons in the Middle East.
–“Tehran Times Accuses Israel, USA of Violating Chemical Weapons Convention,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 May 2003.
22 May 2003
Egyptian biologist, Dr. Wajdi Abd-al-Fattah Sawahil, claims that Israel uses chemical drugs to torture and elicit information from Palestinian detainees and is using gases on Palestinians that lead to infertility.
–Jamal al-Majaydah, “Egyptian Scientist: Israel produces viruses that attack Palestinians only,” FBIS GMP20030522000144, 22 May 2003.
28 June 2003
The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) broadcasts a documentary entitled “Israel’s Secret Weapons.” The documentary states that Israel has used chemical weapons in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
–“Quote Unquote,” The Jerusalem Report, 28 July 2003.
3 August 2003
The U.S. company Sundstran agrees to pay a $171,500 civil penalty because it sold centrifugal pumps to Israel. The pumps can be used to help create chemical weapons.
–“US Company Fined for Exporting Chemical Weapon Components to Israel and Saudi Arabia,” MENA Business Reports, 3 August 2003.
18-19 September 2003
At the Moscow International Proliferation Conference, Iran’s Deputy Director General of International Political Affairs Ali Asghar Soltanieh states that Israel has developed chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.
–“The Proliferation Problem According to Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 October 2003, available at <http://www.ceip.org>, accessed on 10/11/03.
20 to 24 October 2003
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) holds the Eighth Session of the Conference of the States Parties. Israel attends and participates as an observer.
–Report of the Eighth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 20 – 24 October 2003, C-8/7, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 24 October 2003, p. 1, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/c807.pdf>.
20 December 2003
Ahmad Abu-Zayd, Chairman of Egypt’s People’s Assembly Arab Affairs Committee, urges Israel and all Mideast countries to follow Libya’s example and dismantle their WMD programs.
–“Egyptian official urges Israel to dismantle nuclear, chemical Weapons,” BBC Monitoring, 20 December 2003. Source
Unbeknownst to most Americans, Israel’s westernmost settlement is not located in Palestine-Israel, but is 6000 miles away on the high ground overlooking Foggy Bottom in Washington D.C.
This Capital Hill settlement of pro-Israel lobbies and think tanks strategically controls the high ground overlooking the United States’ Middle East policy landscape by having made kibbutzniks of most members of the executive and legislative branches of the government — including President-elect Obama, Vice President-elect Biden (a wannabe Zionist), and future Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (a born Zionist).
While Israel’s hilltop settlements in the occupied territories –violating over 30 UN Security Council resolutions since 1968 — are “”facts on the ground”” that make the two state peace solution unlikely, their hilltop settlement in the center of the world’s only superpower makes it equally unlikely that Israel’s right-wing government will feel compelled to end their “”self defensive”” brutalization of the Palestinian people, which has been condemned by the international community (UN, EU) as crimes against humanity. Source
Iran needs the 20 percent-enriched uranium to fuel The Tehran Research Reactor, which produces radio medicine for cancer patients.
The country has been promised nuclear fuel for over 30 years now. Despite being a 10-percent shareholder and hence entitled to the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium (Eurodif)’s output, Iran has never received enriched uranium from France.
Tehran and Paris have also signed a deal, under which France is obliged to deliver 50 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Iran — another obligation France has failed to meet. Source
Resolution 487 (1981)Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA/Refrain from Acts or Threats
UN nuclear assembly has called for Israel to open its nuclear facilities to UN inspection/September 2009
Israel’s Dirty Nuclear Secrets, Human Experiments and WMD
What the World Needs to know about Mordechai Vanunu
Israel and US were behind the Georgian Attacks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Weird isn’t it the country that lets inspectors in and Iran lets them in all the time is guilty and the two countries who refuse inspections are the ones threatening and accusing.
The US and Israel both should allow inspectors in and both should stop breaking the law.
This US/Israeli rhetoric has been going on for a few decades now.
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